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Abstract
We analyze the effects of declining population growth on the adoption of automa-
tion technology. A standard theoretical framework of the accumulation of traditional
physical capital and of automation capital predicts that countries with a lower popula-
tion growth rate are the ones that innovate and/or adopt new automation technologies
faster. We test the theoretical prediction by means of panel data for 60 countries over
the time span from 1993 to 2013. Regression estimates provide empirical support for
the theoretical prediction and suggest that a 1% increase in population growth is as-
sociated with approximately a 2% reduction in the growth rate of robot density. Our
results are robust to the inclusion of standard control variables, the use of different
estimation methods, the consideration of a dynamic framework with the lagged de-
pendent variable as regressor, and changing the measurement of the stock of robots.
JEL classification: J11, O14, O33, O40.
Keywords: Automation, Industrial Robots, Demographic Change, Declining Popu-
lation Growth, Economic Growth.
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1 Introduction
Industrialized countries have experienced substantial declines in fertility and in birth rates
over the last few decades. For example, in the United States, the total fertility rate (TFR)
fell from 3.33 children per woman in the period 1950-1955 to 1.89 children per woman in
the period 2010-2015. Over the same time span, the crude birth rate (CBR) decreased
from 24.4 children per 1000 inhabitants to 12.6 children per 1000 inhabitants (see The
United Nations, 2015, and Table 1 in which we depict the situation in the G7 countries).
These demographic changes have already had a pronounced effect on the evolution of the
labor force. Furthermore, the relatively larger cohorts that entered the labor markets of
these countries in the 1960s and 1970s are now starting to reach the retirement age such
that a substantial decline in the working-age population is most likely to prevail in the
coming decades.
There are many concerns among economists regarding the long-run consequences of
the mentioned demographic developments. For example, it is often argued that social se-
curity systems and retirement schemes would need to be reformed to ensure that they are
accurately financed in the future when fewer and fewer workers will have to support ever
more retirees (see Gruber and Wise, 1998; Bloom et al., 2010; The Economist, 2011), there
are concerns that investment rates will decline when the retiring cohorts run down their
assets (Mankiw and Weil, 1989; Schich, 2008), and some are afraid that the innovative
capacity of aging societies will decline (see, for example, Canton et al., 2002; Borghans
and ter Weel, 2002; Irmen and Litina, 2016; Gehringer and Prettner, 2017). Some com-
mentators have even gone so far as to argue that aging is a “threat more grave and certain
than those posed by chemical weapons, nuclear proliferation, or ethnic strife” (Peterson,
1999).
Table 1: TFR in the G7 countries 1950-1955 and 2010-2015 (United Nations, 2015)
Country TFR TFR CBR CBR
1950-1955 2010-2015 1950-1955 2010-2015
Canada 3.65 1.61 27.4 10.9
France 2.75 2.00 19.1 12.4
Germany 2.13 1.39 15.6 8.3
Italy 2.36 1.43 18.2 8.6
Japan 3.00 1.40 23.8 8.3
U.K. 2.18 1.92 15.1 12.6
USA 3.33 1.89 24.4 12.6
As far as the expected labor shortages due to population aging are concerned, there
is a silver lining on the horizon. In recent years, robots have started to take over many
tasks that have previously been regarded as non-automatable and it is expected that
this trend will continue in the future (see Frey and Osborne, 2013; Arntz et al., 2016;
Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017, for different views on the extent of this development and
for a discussion on how automation could alleviate the burden of population aging). Very
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prominent examples that have received an extensive media coverage in recent years are
autonomous cars and lorries that could soon transport passengers and goods without the
need to rely on the (usually highly imperfect) driving skills of humans (fully automated
food deliveries are already present in some cities, see El Pais, 2016); 3D printers are starting
to produce highly specialized products – that could not be mass-manufactured before and
which therefore required a lot of specialized human labor input – at a large scale; software
based on machine learning is now already able to more reliably diagnose diseases than
doctors; and even the skills of authors become more and more obsolete as algorithms are
able to write newsflashes, reports, and even novels on their own.1 Admittedly, it is still
a much bigger pleasure to read “Anna Karenina” than “True Love” (a novel written by
an algorithm programmed to rewrite Anna Karenina in the style of the Japanese author
Haruki Murakami; see Barrie, 2014). However, things might change quite fast and maybe
we will some day find out how “The Castle” or “The Man Without Qualities” could have
come to an end – hopefully in the style of Kafka and Musil, respectively.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide some theoretical consid-
erations on the potential effects of automation in the face of the demographic changes
outlined in the introduction and we assess for which countries with a given demographic
structure the adoption of robots is most likely to occur at a fast rate. In Section 3 we test
the theoretical predictions empirically and in Section 4 we discuss our results and draw
some policy conclusions.
2 Declining population growth and automation: Theoreti-
cal considerations
2.1 Basic assumptions
Consider an economy with three production factors, human labor, traditional capital (ma-
chines, assembly lines, production halls, office buildings, etc.), and automation capital
(robots, 3D printers, driverless cars, devices based on machine learning, etc). Time t
evolves discretely such that one time step corresponds to approximately 25 years and
the population grows at rate n between time t and time t + 1. Traditional capital and
automation capital can be accumulated and they fully depreciate over the course of one
generation. Human labor and traditional physical capital are imperfect substitutes, while
automation capital is – by its definition – a perfect substitute for labor. Note the special
and non-standard role that automation capital plays in such a setting: on the one hand, it
performs the tasks of human labor and therefore constitutes a perfect substitute for this
production factor; on the other hand, its accumulation resembles the process of standard
physical capital accumulation and the income stream that automation capital generates
1See, for example, The Economist (2014), Abeliansky et al. (2015), Lanchester (2015), Graetz and
Michaels (2015), Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2016), and Prettner (2017) on different aspects of automation
and on new developments
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flows to the capital owners/savers of an economy. Overall, we follow the simplified expo-
sition of Solow (1956) and assume that households save a constant fraction s ∈ (0, 1) of
their total income. The savings rate could also be endogenized along the lines of Ramsey
(1928), Cass (1965), and Koopmans (1965) but this would mainly complicate the exposi-
tion without adding substantially new insights regarding the effect of demographic change
on automation. In a very interesting contribution, Steigum (2011) analyzes the effects
of automation capital that is a (potentially imperfect) substitute for human labor, on
long-run economic growth.2
2.2 Households and population growth
The population size is given by Nt and its evolution is governed by the difference equation
Nt+1 = (1 + n)Nt,
where n is the population growth rate. This rate is expected to fall in the future because
of the demographic changes outlined in the introduction. We assume that there is inelastic
labor supply of households and full employment such that the labor force at time t is also
given by Lt ≡ Nt. Consequently, a reduction in the population growth rate translates into
a reduction in the growth rate of the work-force which is realistic, although, of course, it
typically requires a certain amount of time. We abstract from this delay and assume that
the decline of the population growth rate also represents the decline in the work-force.
Aggregate savings are given by St+1 = sNt and there are two savings vehicles, tradi-
tional physical capital and automation capital. As a consequence, there is a no-arbitrage
condition that has to hold in any equilibrium in which individuals are investing in both
types of assets. This condition states that the rates of return on traditional physical
capital and on automation capital have to be equal.
2.3 Production and automation
We follow Prettner (2017) and assume that the production function has a Cobb-Douglas
structure with respect to human labor and traditional physical capital. However, the
additional non-standard production factor “automation capital” is a perfect substitute for
labor such that aggregate output is given by
Yt = K
α
t [Lt + Pt]
1−α,
where Kt refers to traditional physical capital, Pt denotes automation capital, and α ∈
(0, 1) is the elasticity of output with respect to traditional physical capital. We abstract
2Endogenizing the savings rate along the lines of Diamond (1965), however, runs into problems because
the accumulation of automation capital reduces the wages of households in the first period of their lives
and therefore reduces their savings capacity, which leads to a stagnation equilibrium (Sachs and Kotlikoff,
2012; Benzell et al., 2015; Sachs et al., 2015; Gasteiger and Prettner, 2017). However, it is more realistic
that savings are not only made out of wage income but also out of capital income.
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from factor-augmenting technological progress that would only act as an additional source
of economic growth but it would not alter the crucial mechanisms in our framework.3 We
assume that there is perfect competition on factor markets such that production factors
are paid their marginal value product. Normalizing the price of final output to 1, the wage
rate and the rates of return on the two types of capital are given by
wt = (1− α)
[
Kt
Lt + Pt
]α
, (1)
Rautomt+1 = wt = (1− α)
[
Kt
Lt + Pt
]α
, (2)
Rtradt+1 = α
[
Lt + Pt
Kt
]1−α
, (3)
where Rautomt+1 is the gross interest rate paid on automation capital, which is equal to the
wage rate, and Rtradt+1 is the gross interest rate paid on traditional physical capital. While
the effects of Kt and Lt on wages and on the rate of return on traditional physical capital
are straightforward, we have a non-standard effect of the accumulation of automation cap-
ital: As Pt increases, the wage rate decreases because workers compete with automation
capital, whereas the rate of return on traditional physical capital increases because au-
tomation capital substitutes for workers and therefore raises the productivity of traditional
physical capital. Together with the fact that the income stream earned by automation
capital flows to the capital owners this mechanism has the potential to explain the decrease
in the labor income share that we have observed over the last few decades (Steigum, 2011;
Prettner, 2017). It is important to note at this point, that, while automation reduces the
marginal value product of labor and thereby the wage rate, labor productivity as measured
by output per worker increases in the wake of automation.
The no-arbitrage condition states that investments in both types of physical capital
have to yield the same rate of return, i.e., it holds that Rautomt+1 = R
trad
t+1 . Setting Equations
(2) and (3) equal to each other and solving for Kt and Pt, respectively, yields
Pt =
1− α
α
Kt − Lt ⇔ Kt = α
1− α(Pt + Lt). (4)
Plugging the expression for traditional physical capital from Equation (4) into the
aggregate production function provides
Yt =
(
α
1− α
)
[Lt + Pt], (5)
where it is immediately clear that the standard convergence process to a stationary equi-
3For an R&D-based endogenous growth model along the lines of Romer (1990) in which firms can
invest in robot technology, see He´mous and Olsen (2016). In Acemoglu and Restrepo (2015) new tasks are
constantly created by R&D, while, at the same time, old tasks are automated. Both of these papers focus
on a different aspect of the rise of machines than the implications of demographic change for investments
in (and the adoption of) automation technology.
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librium with no long-run growth that we know from the Solow (1956) model without
technological progress does not hold anymore. Instead, the production function has the
potential to lead to long-run growth if the savings rate is large enough such that a positive
accumulation rate of automation capital can be sustained (cf. Steigum, 2011; Prettner,
2017). Note that Equation (5) resembles the properties of an AK type of production
structure. However, in contrast to standard AK type of growth models this is not due
to an assumption that removes the diminishing marginal product with respect to physical
capital but due to the structure of the production process as derived in the presence of
automation capital.4 Allowing for a different rate of depreciation for traditional physical
capital and for automation capital would leave our central results unchanged. The only
difference would be that an additional constant term (the difference between the rates
of depreciation between the two forms of capital) appeared in Equation (4) and in the
derivations that are based on this equation.
From Equation (5) it follows that per capita GDP is given by
yt =
(
α
1− α
)
(pt + 1),
where pt is the automation density in terms of automation capital per capita. We immedi-
ately see that the prosperity of a country is positively linked to its automation density. The
intuitive explanation for this is clear. For a given population size, automation overcomes
the diminishing marginal product of traditional physical capital that acts as a boundary
for long-run economic growth in the standard Solow (1956) model (see Prettner, 2017,
for the analysis of the implications of automation for long-run economic growth in such a
setting). Once the tasks which could previously only be carried out by human labor are
automated, the stock of labor becomes, essentially, a reproducible production factor. At
the aggregate level, this implies that there are constant returns to scale with respect to all
reproducible production factors such that automation creates the potential for long-run
growth without additional factor-augmenting technological progress. Next, we analyze
how the automation density itself depends on the demographic setting, which is our main
question of interest that we analyze empirically in Section 3.
2.4 The effect of demographic change on automation density
Since households save a constant fraction s ∈ (0, 1) of their total income Yt and the
economy is closed, aggregate investment is It = sYt such that
Kt+1 + Pt+1 = sYt.
4Peretto and Saeter (2013) construct a long-run economic growth model in which firms can invest in
technological progress that raises the productivity of physical capital by increasing the elasticity of final
output with respect to physical capital. In the long-run limit, their aggregate production function converges
to an AK type of production function and economic growth is perpetual.
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Substituting for Kt+1 by the no-arbitrage relationship (4), for Yt by Equation (5), and
dividing by the population size Nt+1 provides the following expression
α(pt+1 + 1)
1− α + pt+1 = s
(
α
1− α
)α 1 + pt
1 + n
.
Solving this equation for the automation density in period t + 1 as a function of the
automation density in period t and the parameter values of the model yields
pt+1 = s(1− α)
(
α
1− α
)α 1 + pt
1 + n
− α. (6)
From this equation it follows immediately that a country with a lower population growth
rate will have a higher density of automation technology. We summarize this in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. Consider a country in which the production structure is described by an
aggregate production function of the form of Equation (5). Households save a constant
fraction s ∈ (0, 1) of their total income (labor income and capital income in the form of
traditional physical capital and automation capital), and the no-arbitrage condition (4)
holds for both types of investments. In this case a country will have a higher density of
automation capital if it has a lower population growth rate (n).
Proof. Taking the derivative of Equation (6) with respect to n we get
∂pt+1
∂n
= −s(1− α)
(
α
1− α
)α 1 + pt
(1 + n)2
< 0.
Not that this expression is, in general, not equal to -1 such that our result is not just due
to the fact that automation density is defined as the aggregate stock of robots divided by
the population size.
The intuition for this finding is the following: A country in which the population –
and with it the labor force – grows fast, exhibits a comparably high rate of return on
traditional physical capital and there is no need to invest in automation capital. In fact,
in such a country, the rate of return on investment in automation capital tends to be rather
low (think, for example, of African countries with a very fast population growth rate such
as Mali and Niger: investing in automation would not be an attractive business strategy
in these countries). By contrast, in a country in which the population – and with it the
labor force – stagnates or even decreases, the rate of return on investment in automation
is high and the rate of return on investment in traditional physical capital is rather low
(think, for example, of aging European countries such as Germany and Italy and aging
East Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea). Consequently, our theory predicts
that the automation density is high in countries in which the growth rate of the population
is low or even negative.
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Table 2: Robot density and population growth in the top 10 countries with the highest
robot density (International Federation of Robotics, 2015; United Nations, 2015)
Country robot density per 10,000 employees average population growth
in manufacturing between 2010 and 2015
South Korea 347 0.48%
Japan 339 -0.12%
Germany 261 0.16%
Italy 159 0.07%
Sweden 157 0.83%
Denmark 145 0.42%
United States 135 0.75%
Spain 131 -0.21%
Finland 130 0.50%
Taiwan 129 N/A
Note: The robot density is measured in terms of robots per 10,000 employees in manufacturing in
2015. The population growth rate is calculated as the average population growth rate from 2010 to
2015. The data sources are (International Federation of Robotics, 2015; United Nations, 2015).
A first glimpse on whether this is true is provided by Table 2 that depicts the robot
density as of 2015 together with the average population growth rate in the preceding 5-year
interval from 2010 to 2015 for the ten countries with the highest robot density. In general,
we observe that the population growth rate in these countries is rather low and in some
of them even negative. However, this could just be due to the fact that these countries
are richer, implying that they have a lower fertility rate and that they are, at the same
time, able to invest more in automation technology. In the next section we therefore test
whether our theoretical implication is borne out by the data in a more thorough way.
3 Declining population growth and automation: Empirical
results
In this section we introduce the data, then we test Proposition 1 empirically, and finally
we provide a number of robustness checks.
3.1 Data description
The only available data-set so far to study the adoption of robots is the one collected by
the International Federation of Robotics (IFR). The IFR reports the yearly delivery of
“multipurpose manipulating industrial robots” as defined by the International Organiza-
tion for Standardization5 for several countries, starting from 1993. We use the data until
2013 because the data for the year 2014 seem to be unreliable: There are several zeroes
that look like reporting errors in comparison to previous values from the data series. In
5This refers to “Manipulating industrial robot as defined by ISO 8373: An automatically controlled,
reprogrammable, multipurpose manipulator programmable in three or more axes, which may be either fixed
in place or mobile for use in industrial automation applications” (Graetz and Michaels, 2015; International
Federation of Robotics, 2012).
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the baseline specification we use 3 year averages of the data which provides us with 7
time periods. The sample includes 60 countries for which the data are available (for the
list of countries see Table 9 in the Appendix). We had to combine the NAFTA countries
(Canada, the United States, and Mexico) into one country because they report the values
jointly until 2011.
The IFR also reports the deliveries and stock of robots at the industry level. They
consider that robots have a life-time horizon of 12 years, after which they are deployed
(International Federation of Robotics, 2016). Following Graetz and Michaels (2015), we
use an alternative way to calculate the stock of robots (for all robots and for the manufac-
turing industry) that relies on the perpetual inventory method under the assumption of a
depreciation rate of 10%. Similar to Graetz and Michaels (2015), we prefer this method
over the one used by the IFR because it is more in line with the standard economics
literature. Since the IFR reports the stock of robots in 1993, this is our first value for the
constructed series. Although all countries report the total stock of robots, not all of them
report the stock nor the deliveries disaggregated at the industry level on a yearly basis.
Given that we are mainly interested in the robots used in the manufacturing sector, we
follow Graetz and Michaels (2015) and take the average share of deliveries of manufac-
turing robots over the total deliveries of robots (when the data are available), construct
an average share, and impute the values for deliveries of manufacturing robots, as well as
for the initial stock of robots (when the corresponding data were not available). In Table
8 in the Appendix we show the first reported year of robots’ data disaggregated by the
industry level for the countries for which there were gaps in the reported data.
In the following figures we show how the robot density has evolved between the first
period of the sample (1993-1995) and the last one (2011-2013). We discriminate between
percentiles with Figure 1 (covering the period 1993-1995) reporting in the lightest shade
of blue for the 75th percentile, proceeding with the 90th percentile, the 95th percentile,
and finally the last 5% of the distribution (there are a lot of zeroes in this period which is
why we use the 75th percentile as the first cutoff). For comparison, in Figure 2 (covering
the period 2011-2013) we use the same cutoffs as in the previous figure. We observe a
strong increase in robot density, especially in Europe and South Asia. Similar figures but
only for robots used in the manufacturing sector are displayed in the Appendix (Figures
3 and 4).
We also collected information from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the
investment share in terms of GDP. We constructed our investment variable summing the
reported values of private investment, public investment, and joint ventures between the
state and the private sector. As for other control variables, we included GDP per capita
measured in constant US$ with a base year of 2010 from the World Development Indicators,
openness measured as exports and imports over GDP, and the gross enrollment ratio in
secondary school as in Busse and Spielmann (2006)6.
6The natural choice of a proxy variable for education would have been the mean years of schooling as
reported by (Barro and Lee, 2013). However, this variable is only available in 5 year intervals. Another
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Figure 1: Average robot density for the period 1993-1995
[0,.00012]
(.00012,.0003]
(.0003,.0005]
(.0005,.003]
No data
Source: IFR and World Development Indicators. Note: The USA, Canada and Mexico
have the same values because of the joint reporting.
Figure 2: Average robot density in the period 2011-2013
[0,.00012]
(.00012,.0003]
(.0003,.0005]
(.0005,.003]
No data
Source: IFR and World Development Indicators. Note: The USA, Canada and Mexico
have the same values because of the joint reporting.
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3.2 Empirical estimates
Based on Proposition 1, we estimate the relationship between robots adoption and popu-
lation growth by means of the following equation:
ln(pˆi,t) = c+ α ln(ni,t−1) + β ln(si,t−1) + γ ln(xi,t−1) + dt + i,t, (7)
where pˆi,t is the growth rate of the stock of robots (either manufacturing robots, or the
total amount of robots), ni,t−1 is the population growth rate between period t-1 and t-2,
si,t−1 is the investment rate in period t − 1, xi,t−1 is a vector of further control variables
that will be used in the robustness analysis (i.e. GDP per capita), and dt are time-specific
effects to control for events and trends that affect all countries in the same manner, for
example, the global economic and financial crisis that started in 2007/2008. Since we have
zeroes and negative values in the dependent variable and in the population growth rate,
we employed the Box-Cox transformation (Box and Cox, 1964) instead of simply applying
logarithms.7 We apply the logarithmic transformation because this alleviates concerns
regarding heteroskedasticity and non-linearities in the non-transformed variables. We
relied on 3-year averages to alleviate problems regarding measurement errors and business-
cycle effects (while the economic growth literature usually relies on 5 year averages, we
would only have 2 consecutive time periods left for estimation in this case).
We first estimate Equation (7) using pooled OLS (POLS) and then proceed with a
random-effects (RE) and a fixed-effects (FE) specification. Finally, we take the potential
dynamics into account by including the lagged dependent variable in the regressions and
applying various corrected fixed effects estimators (CorrFE) following Bruno (2005a,b),
and the system GMM estimator [GMM (sys)] of Blundell and Bond (1998). Note that both
of these types of estimators are seen as remedies for the Nickell (1981) bias in a dynamic
panel data setting. We report the results for the total amount of robots and then also
separately for the subset of manufacturing robots. Moreover, we assess the robustness of
our results by adding a proxy for education, a proxy for GDP per capita, and a proxy for
openness. In other robustness checks reported in the Appendix, we also consider different
depreciation rates in the construction of the robot data series (5% and 15% instead of
10%), and a different transformation of the robot adoption and population growth rates
[a neglog transformation as employed by Whittaker et al. (2005)].
Based on the theoretical considerations we expect to find a negative coefficient for the
population growth rate that is smaller than -1 and a positive sign for the investment rate.
When we include the controls, we expect a positive coefficient for GDP per capita because
higher income implies a lower return to traditional capital accumulation and therefore
alternative would have been to use the literacy rate but this is close to one in most countries of the sample
and there are also a lot of missing values for this variable, so we decided to stick with the gross enrollment
ratio (Busse and Spielmann, 2006, also uses this variable).
7We created a new variable in the following manner: z = ln(growth rate − k), choosing k such that
the skewness of z is zero. The correlation between the non-transformed variables and the variables in
logarithms (naturally omitting the zeroes and the negative values) is 0.89.
11
a higher incentive to employ robots. Furthermore, a better educated population might
be more inclined to invest in (or adapt to) robots such that he coefficient of education
should also be positive. However, we have no a priori expectation regarding the sign of
the coefficient for openness – on the one hand, as countries become more open, they could
need fewer robots because domestic production could easier be substituted by imports;
on the other hand, open economies are also subject to stronger international competition
such that there is an incentive to automatize the production in search of efficiency gains.
3.2.1 Main Results
Table 3 contains the regression outputs from a baseline specification of Equation (7).
As regressors we include the two crucial variables that are suggested by our theoretical
considerations in Equation (6), the population growth rate and the investment rate. We
observe that there is a negative relationship between population growth and the growth
rate of the robot density in all specifications and it is statistically significant in the majority
of the cases. Only in column (1), which reports the POLS regression, we find the coefficient
not to be statistically significant which is most likely due to the lack of accounting of
country-level heterogeneity. Our results are robust to the dynamic specifications using
the corrected fixed effects estimators, as well as the system GMM estimator. For the
choice between corrected fixed effects and system GMM we prefer the corrected fixed
effects specifications because Judson and Owen (1999) report that this estimator performs
better when the amount of time periods is smaller than 10, which is the case in our
sample. Although the lagged dependent variable is statistically significant, the size of the
coefficient does not suggest strong evidence for the use of a dynamic specification. Our
preferred specification is therefore the fixed effects regression because the Hausman test
suggests that the results from the random effects specification are inconsistent and that
we therefore the need to control for unobserved heterogeneity. The coefficient estimate
for the population growth rate in case of the fixed-effects specification suggests that when
population growth increases by 1%, the robot density growth will decrease by 2%. As
far as the main control variable (the investment share) is concerned, we find the expected
positive relationship, although it is not statistically significant.
Table 4 shows the results for the growth rate of the manufacturing robot density.
As in the previous case, we document a positive correlation, although not statistically
significant, between the investment rate and the growth rate of the manufacturing robots
density. We again find a negative association between the population growth rate and
the robots density growth rate with the size of the coefficients being similar to the those
reported in Table 3. In this case, there is even less evidence than before for the need of a
dynamic specification because the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable are smaller
in size and not even statistically significant in the case of the system GMM estimator.
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Table 3: The relation between total robots growth and population growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POLS RE FE CorrFE (bb) CorrFE (ab) CorrFE (ah) GMM (sys)
pˆt−1 0.316*** 0.259*** 0.245** 0.226**
(0.779) (0.090) (0.0987) (0.111)
nt−1 -0.539 -0.694* -2.030** -1.690*** -1.803*** -1.828*** -3.515***
(0.328) (0.354) (0.894) (0.597) (0.562) (0.557) (1.205)
st−1 0.063 0.090 0.419 0.304 0.324 0.335 0.115
(0.119) (0.129) (0.495) (0.357) (0.340) (0.341) (0.473)
Country FE no no yes yes yes yes -
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
AR(2) test 0.922
Hansen test 0.623
Countries 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Observations 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
Note: We report standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
level, respectively. The standard errors of columns (1), (2), and (3) are clustered at the country level, while
the ones from (4) to (6) are bootstrapped with 50 iterations. Column (7) uses collapsed instruments and
an orthogonal transformation. All of the variables are in logarithms, while population growth and robots
growth were transformed with the Box-Cox transformation. CorrFE refers to the corrected fixed effects with
“bb” indicating initialization by the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator, “ab” initialization by the Arellano
and Bond (1991) estimator, and “ah” initialization by the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator.
Table 4: The relation between manufacturing robots growth and population growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POLS RE FE CorrFE (bb) CorrFE (ab) CorrFE (ah) GMM (sys)
pˆt−1 0.264*** 0.197** 0.180** 0.120
(0.077) (0.086) (0.0914) (0.120)
nt−1 -0.457 -0.632* -2.185** -1.950*** -2.055*** -2.078*** -3.908***
(0.336) (0.368) (0.973) (0.613) (0.570) (0.566) (1.237)
st−1 0.026 0.043 0.175 0.132 0.146 0.155 0.311
(0.095) (0.101) (0.490) (0.365) (0.343) (0.343) (0.401)
Country FE no no yes yes yes yes -
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
AR(2) test 0.623
Hansen test 0.506
Countries 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Observations 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
Note: We report standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
level, respectively. The standard errors of columns (1), (2), and (3) are clustered at the country level, while
the ones from (4) to (6) are bootstrapped with 50 iterations. Column (7) uses collapsed instruments and
an orthogonal transformation. All of the variables are in logarithms, while population growth and robots
growth were transformed with the Box-Cox transformation. CorrFE refers to the corrected fixed effects with
“bb” indicating initialization by the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator, “ab” initialization by the Arellano
and Bond (1991) estimator, and “ah” initialization by the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator.
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3.2.2 Robustness Analysis
As a first robustness check we control for three potential omitted variables: GDP per
capita, openness of the economy, and secondary school enrollment. Omitting these vari-
ables could be a source of bias because GDP per capita might be correlated with the
population growth rate due to the fact that richer countries are more able to invest in new
technologies and they are also the ones that are disproportionally affected by declining
fertility as outlined in Section 1; an open economy might be under more pressure to stay
competitive, and, at the same time, smaller economies by means of the population size
tend to be more open; and education is highly correlated with GDP per capita, while, at
the same time, a better educated population might be more inclined to invest in (or adapt
to) robots.
Table 5: Total robots growth including controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POLS RE FE CorrFE (bb) CorrFE (ab) CorrFE (ah) GMM (sys)
pˆt−1 0.210** 0.137 0.140 0.279
(0.082) (0.085) (0.088) (0.202)
nt−1 -0.565 -0.731* -1.554** -1.377* -1.494** -1.485** -3.247*
(0.379) (0.422) (0.689) (0.754) (0.704) (0.708) (1.879)
st−1 0.092 0.107 -0.416 -0.377 -0.337 -0.336 -0.316
(0.130) (0.134) (0.556) (0.486) (0.443) (0.445) (0.485)
yt−1 -0.172** -0.151** 2.535*** 2.316*** 2.280*** 2.283*** -0.080
(0.073) (0.073) (0.911) (0.883) (0.784) (0.787) (0.421)
et−1 0.148 0.133 0.112 0.106 0.111 0.111 0.334
(0.180) (0.176) (0.192) (0.185) (0.171) (0.171) (0.244)
opent−1 0.040 0.034 -0.088 -0.149 -0.136 -0.139 -0.144
(0.142) (0.155) (0.519) (0.552) (0.503) (0.506) (0.795)
Country FE no no yes yes yes yes -
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
AR(2) test 0.979
Hansen test 0.156
Countries 57 57 57 57 57 57
Observations 262 262 262 262 262 262 262
Note: We report standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
level, respectively. The standard errors of columns (1), (2), and (3) are clustered at the country level, while
the ones from (4) to (6) are bootstrapped with 50 iterations. Column (7) uses collapsed instruments and
an orthogonal transformation. All of the variables are in logarithms, while population growth and robots
growth were transformed with the Box-Cox transformation. CorrFE refers to the corrected fixed effects with
“bb” indicating initialization by the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator, “ab” initialization by the Arellano
and Bond (1991) estimator, and “ah” initialization by the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator.
Table 5, which includes the mentioned control variables, shows again a negative cor-
relation between robot density growth and population growth. The magnitude of the
coefficients in the different specifications are marginally smaller than in the previous ta-
bles. However, except for the pooled OLS specification, they are statistically significant
at the 5% or at the 10% level. One reason for this could be that we had to accept a
reduction in the sample size because of several missing observations for the openness and
the secondary enrollment variables. The coefficient estimate of the investment rate is still
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Table 6: Manufacturing robots growth including controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POLS RE FE CorrFE (bb) CorrFE (ab) CorrFE (ah) GMM (sys)
pˆt−1 0.148* 0.064 0.60 0.043
(0.078) (0.079) (0.081) (0.131)
nt−1 -0.472 -0.636 -1.726** -1.599** -1.700** -1.697** -1.833
(0.382) (0.422) (0.702) (0.771) (0.703) (0.706) (1.218)
st−1 0.061 0.067 -0.646 -0.586 -0.567 -0.570 -0.241
(0.109) (0.108) (0.558) (0.496) (0.441) (0.442) (0.349)
yt−1 -0.197*** -0.181*** 2.617*** 2.531*** 2.551*** 2.580*** -0.523***
(0.068) (0.067) (0.841) (0.899) (0.785) (0.787) (0.169)
et−1 0.187 0.182 0.174 0.171 0.174 0.173 0.352*
(0.175) (0.166) (0.174) (0.189) (0.171) (0.171) (0.180)
opent−1 0.024 0.021 0.000 -0.059 -0.033 -0.036 -0.392
(0.148) (0.158) (0.515) (0.566) (0.504) (0.507) (0.659)
Country FE no no yes yes yes yes -
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
AR(2) test - - - - - - 0.720
Hansen test - - - - - - 0.234
Countries 57 57 57 57 57 57 57
Observations 262 262 262 262 262 262 262
Note: We report standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
level, respectively. The standard errors of columns (1), (2), and (3) are clustered at the country level, while
the ones from (4) to (6) are bootstrapped with 50 iterations. Column (7) uses collapsed instruments and
an orthogonal transformation. All of the variables are in logarithms, while population growth and robots
growth were transformed with the Box-Cox transformation. CorrFE refers to the corrected fixed effects with
“bb” indicating initialization by the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator, “ab” initialization by the Arellano
and Bond (1991) estimator, and “ah” initialization by the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator.
not statistically significant across the specifications, as in the previous case. In columns
(1) and (2), GDP per capita has a negative sign, which is surprising given that we expect
that richer countries would be able to invest more in new technologies. However, GDP
per capita reverts its sign from column (3) onwards. We believe that the reason for this is
the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, as also the Hausman test indicates. Secondary
enrollment has the predicted sign, although it is not statistically significant. Finally, open-
ness has a negative sign in most of the specifications although none of the coefficients is
statistically significant. Finally, the coefficient size of the lagged dependent variable shows
that there is no pressing need to take the dynamics into account in the regression.
Turning to the manufacturing robots (Table 6), we observe a similar pattern as for the
case of total robots. All specifications show a negative correlation between manufacturing
robots growth and population growth. In contrast to the previous results, we find no
statistical significance in column (7). However, this could be related to the fact that we do
not need a dynamic specification and that the system GMM estimator is known to be very
inefficient in case of a small time dimension. As in the previous tables we find no evidence
of the importance of investment or secondary schooling for robots adoption. Similar to the
case of total robots, we find a positive relationship between GDP per capita and the growth
rate of manufacturing robots density. A puzzling result is the change in the sign of per
capita GDP in case of the system GMM estimator. However, the estimations performed
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with the corrected fixed effects estimators still exhibit the significantly positive result.
In Tables 10 and 11 in the Appendix we report the same specification but omitting the
controls that were not statistically significant (i.e., secondary enrollment and openness).
The results do not change dramatically but the significance of the puzzling negative sign
of per capita GDP in case of the system GMM estimator vanishes.
As further robustness checks, we used 2-year averages instead of averaging the data over
3 years. Tables 12 and 13 in the Appendix show the corresponding results. As before, we
observe a statistically significant negative correlation of the population growth rate with
the growth of robot density (either of the total stock of robots or the ones employed in the
manufacturing sector). However, the magnitude of the correlation is smaller in absolute
value. The investment rate coefficient continues to be statistically insignificant in both
tables, having a positive sign in most of the cases. Only in column (7) of Table 13 the
coefficient of the investment rate is negative, although this estimate should be considered
with caution because the AR(2) test cannot rule out remaining autocorrelation of the
residuals at the 10% significance level. Moreover, we also constructed two alternative
robot stocks using 5% and 15% as alternative depreciation rates. The estimates for the
baseline model can be seen in Tables 14 and 16 (for total robots) and Tables 15 and 16
(for manufacturing robots) in the Appendix. We find no substantial differences with our
previous estimates. As the two final robustness checks we use the neglog transformation for
both the population growth rate and the robot density growth rate. This transformation
involves making the following adjustments to the variable (which we call x for simplicity).
If x <= 0, then we use − ln(−x+1) instead and if x > 0, then we use ln(x+1) instead. The
results are shown in Tables 18 and 19 of the Appendix. Again, the results remain similar
in terms of the sign and the statistical significance, although the size of the coefficients
is higher. The results show some sensitivity with relation to the transformation of the
variables that can take the value of 0 or negative values.
4 Conclusions
We propose a theoretical framework of production in the age of automation for countries
that are subject to declining population growth and population aging. In so doing we
introduce a new production factor that resembles the properties of labor in the produc-
tion process, i.e., it is a perfect substitute for labor, while it resembles the properties of
traditional physical capital in the accumulation process, i.e., it is accumulated in the same
manner as physical capital due to the savings and investment behavior of households.
For this case the standard Solow (1956) framework predicts, under certain circumstances,
perpetual growth even without technological progress and a declining labor income share
(Prettner, 2017). In our contribution we show that countries with a lower population
growth rate have a stronger incentive to invest in the adoption of automation. The empir-
ical estimates that we present, subject to several robustness tests, support this theoretical
prediction.
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As far as the policy implications are concerned, our theoretical and empirical findings
suggest that countries, which are subject to larger demographic challenges, will be the
first to adopt and/or invent new automation technologies. This in turn might help them
to overcome some of the negative effects that declining population growth and population
aging imply for long-run economic prosperity, issues that also the media is nowadays
heavily concerned with (see, for example, The Washington Post, 2016). Of course, the
transition to automation technologies might not be all that smooth because automation
capital competes with labor and therefore could act so as to depress wages. If this concern
is valid and widespread, it might lead to resistance against automation from labor unions
and the population at large. Altogether, it might therefore be in everybody’s interest
if governments enact policies that alleviate the burden of those who suffer because of
automation. Potential policies along these lines could include education subsidies and
re-training programs for those who loose their jobs because of automation, making sure
that unemployment insurance is widely available, etc. Furthermore, it would at some
point be necessary to rethink how social security systems are financed because the main
contribution is now made by the production factor labor. If labor income becomes a
smaller and smaller share of total income, however, alternatives would need to be found.
One remedy that is often suggested would be to make sure that everybody owns some
part of the automation capital of an economy, for example, a driverless car that earns an
income stream for him or her (Pratt, 2015; The Economist, 2017).
Of course we have to admit that our framework stayed deliberately simple and the
results that we present are meant as a first step in the direction of analyzing the interre-
lations between demography and automation. In reality, there are different skill groups
in the population and the tasks that are performed by the different skill groups might be
more or less suited to automation and they might even change over time (cf. Acemoglu
and Restrepo, 2015). A more detailed framework should be able to take this into account
and to empirically distinguish between the education level of different types of workers,
and also the heterogeneity of tasks that workers perform. However, this crucially hinges
on the data for automation in general, and robots, in particular, to become more widely
available. Furthermore, a more detailed modeling of demographic change is called for that
takes survival to old age and changing life expectancy into account. First steps in this
direction have been undertaken by Gasteiger and Prettner (2017).
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5 Appendix
5.1 Summary Statistics
Table 7: Summary statistics
Variable (in logs) Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
pˆt−1 300 4.300 0.909 -2.126 8.249
nt−1 300 -2.057 0.239 -2.788 -1.179
si;t−1 300 2.879 0.609 -1.697 3.815
yt−1 300 9.351 1.262 6.539 11.408
et−1 267 4.368 0.540 1.616 5.065
opent−1 295 4.262 0.523 2.789 6.033
5.2 Countries included
Table 8: Countries with adjusted values to create manufacturing stock
Country Year Country Year
Argentina 2004 South Korea 2001 (gap in 2002)
Australia 2006 Malaysia 2006
Austria 2003 Mexico 2011
Belgium 2004 Netherlands 2004
Brazil 2004 New Zealand 2006
Bulgaria 2006 Philippines 2006
Canada 2011 Poland 2004
Chile 2005 Portugal 2004
China 2006 Romania 2004
Denmark 1996 Russia 2004
Greece 2006 Singapore 2005
Hungary 2004 Slovakia 2004
Iceland 2006 Slovenia 2005
Malta 2006 South Africa 2005
Peru 2006 Switzerland 2004
India 2006 Thailand 2005
Indonesia 2006 Turkey 2005
Ireland 2006 USA 2004
Israel 2005 Vietnam 2005
Japan 1996
Note: The year indicates the first time that the country reported dis-
aggregated deliveries of robots at the industry level.
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Table 9: Countries included in the sample
Argentina France Moldova Serbia
Australia Germany Morocco Singapore
Austria Greece NAFTA Slovakia
Belgium Hungary Netherlands South Africa
Brazil Iceland New Zealand Spain
Bulgaria India Norway Sweden
Chile Indonesia Oman Switzerland
China Ireland Pakistan Thailand
Colombia Israel Peru Tunisia
Croatia Italy Philippines Turkey
Czech Republic Japan Poland Ukraine
Denmark South Korea Portugal United Kingdom
Egypt Kuwait Romania Uzbekistan
Estonia Lithuania Russia Venezuela
Finland Malaysia Saudi Arabia Vietnam
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5.3 Distribution of the manufacturing stock of robots
Figure 3: Average manufacturing robot density for the period 1993-1995
[0,.0001021]
(.0001021,.0002529]
(.0002529,.0004311]
(.0004311,.003]
No data
Source: IFR and World Development Indicators. Note: The USA, Canada and Mexico
have the same values because of the joint reporting.
Figure 4: Average manufacturing robot density in the period 2011-2013
[0,.0001021]
(.0001021,.0002529]
(.0002529,.0004311]
(.0004311,.003]
No data
Source: IFR and World Development Indicators. Note: The USA, Canada and Mexico
have the same values because of the joint reporting.
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5.4 Estimates with only GDP per capita as control
Table 10: Total robots growth including GDP per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POLS RE FE CorrFE (bb) CorrFE (ab) CorrFE (ah) GMM (sys)
pˆt−1 0.250*** 0.197** 0.197** 0.119
(0.079) (0.092) (0.100) (0.163)
nt−1 h -0.601* -0.732** -1.444* -1.283* -1.430** -1.421** 0.565
(0.320) (0.345) (0.758) (0.659) (0.611) (0.607) (8.093)
st−1 0.102 0.123 0.003 -0.006 0.053 0.052 0.003
(0.143) (0.148) (0.557) (0.400) (0.374) (0.374) (0.420)
yt−1 -0.137*** -0.131*** 2.195*** 1.944** 1.855** 1.872** -0.554
(0.049) (0.048) (0.817) (0.800) (0.737) (0.735) (1.130)
Country FE no no yes yes yes yes -
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
AR(2) test - - - - - - 0.438
Hansen test - - - - - - 0.591
Countries 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Observations 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
Note: We report standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level,
respectively. The standard errors of columns (1), (2), and (3) are clustered at the country level, while the ones from (4) to
(6) are bootstrapped with 50 iterations. Column (7) uses collapsed instruments and an orthogonal transformation. All of the
variables are in logarithms, while population growth and robots growth were transformed with the Box-Cox transformation.
CorrFE refers to the corrected fixed effects with “bb” indicating initialization by the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator,
“ab” initialization by the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator, and “ah” initialization by the Anderson and Hsiao (1982)
estimator.
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Table 11: Manufacturing robots growth including GDP per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POLS RE FE CorrFE (bb) CorrFE (ab) CorrFE (ah) GMM (sys)
pˆt−1 0.186** 0.124 0.119 0.005
(0.078) (0.087) (0.091) (0.082)
nt−1 -0.525 -0.667* -1.554* -1.468** -1.587*** -1.577*** 0.466
(0.326) (0.355) (0.806) (0.674) (0.614) (0.612) (4.403)
st−1 0.069 0.080 -0.272 -0.229 -0.191 -0.197 0.020
(0.119) (0.120) (0.533) (0.409) (0.376) (0.376) (0.476)
yt−1 -0.152*** -0.145*** 2.365*** 2.221*** 2.174*** 2.215*** -0.626
(0.046) (0.046) (0.717) (0.815) (0.740) (0.739) (0.511)
Country FE no no yes yes yes yes -
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
AR(2) test - - - - - - 0.250
Hansen test - - - - - - 0.427
Countries 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Observations 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
Note: We report standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
level, respectively. The standard errors of columns (1), (2), and (3) are clustered at the country level, while the
ones from (4) to (6) are bootstrapped with 50 iterations. Column (7) uses collapsed instruments and an orthogonal
transformation. All of the variables are in logarithms, while population growth and robots growth were transformed
with the Box-Cox transformation. CorrFE refers to the corrected fixed effects with “bb” indicating initialization by
the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator, “ab” initialization by the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator, and “ah”
initialization by the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator.
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5.5 Baseline estimates using 2-year averages instead of 3-year averages
Table 12: Total robots
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POLS RE FE corrFE (bb) corrFE (ab) corrFE (ah) GMM (sys)
pˆt−1 0.366*** 0.351*** 0.393*** 0.291***
(0.049) (0.050) (0.051) (0.071)
nt−1 -0.435 -0.606* -1.160* -0.717** -0.736** -0.706* -1.415*
(0.294) (0.344) (0.594) (0.359) (0.343) (0.370) (0.760)
st−1 0.093 0.135 0.380 0.230 0.247 0.257 0.091
(0.099) (0.108) (0.326) (0.214) (0.196) (0.208) (0.155)
Country FE no no yes yes yes yes -
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
AR(2) test - - - - - - 0.143
Hansen test - - - - - - 0.276
Countries 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Observations 539 539 539 539 539 539 539
Note: We report standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
level, respectively. The standard errors of columns (1), (2), and (3) are clustered at the country level, while
the ones from (4) to (6) are bootstrapped with 50 iterations. Column (7) uses collapsed instruments and
an orthogonal transformation. All of the variables are in logarithms, while population growth and robots
growth were transformed with the Box-Cox transformation. CorrFE refers to the corrected fixed effects with
“bb” indicating initialization by the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator, “ab” initialization by the Arellano
and Bond (1991) estimator, and “ah” initialization by the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator.
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Table 13: Manufacturing robots
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POLS RE FE corrFE (bb) corrFE (ab) corrFE (ah) GMM (sys)
pˆt−1 0.341*** 0.316*** 0.369*** 0.297***
(0.049) (0.050) (0.051) (0.083)
nt−1 -0.336 -0.519 -1.142* -0.775** -0.790** -0.754** -1.398*
(0.292) (0.347) (0.604) (0.364) (0.346) (0.376) (0.780)
st−1 0.058 0.088 0.247 0.132 0.148 0.169 -0.033
(0.074) (0.079) (0.316) (0.219) (0.199) (0.213) (0.195)
Country FE no no yes yes yes yes -
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
AR(2) test - - - - - - 0.055
Hansen test - - - - - - 0.155
Countries 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Observations 539 539 539 539 539 539 539
Note: We report standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
level, respectively. The standard errors of columns (1), (2), and (3) are clustered at the country level, while
the ones from (4) to (6) are bootstrapped with 50 iterations. Column (7) uses collapsed instruments and
an orthogonal transformation. All of the variables are in logarithms, while population growth and robots
growth were transformed with the Box-Cox transformation. CorrFE refers to the corrected fixed effects with
“bb” indicating initialization by the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator, “ab” initialization by the Arellano
and Bond (1991) estimator, and “ah” initialization by the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator.
24
5.6 Baseline estimates using 5% depreciation rate
Table 14: Total robots
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POLS RE FE corrFE (bb) corrFE (ab) corrFE (ah) GMM (sys)
pˆt−1 0.339*** 0.294*** 0.280*** 0.299**
(0.077) (0.088) (0.099) (0.137)
nt−1 -0.591* -0.718** -2.151** -1.731*** -1.835*** -1.862*** -2.687**
(0.332) (0.353) (0.937) (0.645) (0.612) (0.608) (1.291)
st−1 0.077 0.103 0.545 0.385 0.405 0.419 -0.146
(0.125) (0.136) (0.519) (0.387) (0.371) (0.374) (0.622)
Country FE no no yes yes yes yes -
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
AR(2) test - - - - - - 0.783
Hansen test - - - - - - 0.177
Countries 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Observations 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
Note: We report standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
level, respectively. The standard errors of columns (1), (2), and (3) are clustered at the country level, while
the ones from (4) to (6) are bootstrapped with 50 iterations. Column (7) uses collapsed instruments and
an orthogonal transformation. All of the variables are in logarithms, while population growth and robots
growth were transformed with the Box-Cox transformation. CorrFE refers to the corrected fixed effects with
“bb” indicating initialization by the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator, “ab” initialization by the Arellano
and Bond (1991) estimator, and “ah” initialization by the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator.
Table 15: Manufacturing robots
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POLS RE FE corrFE (bb) corrFE (ab) corrFE (ah) GMM (sys)
pˆt−1 0.300*** 0.246*** 0.227** 0.200
(0.076) (0.085) (0.093) (0.128)
nt−1 -0.526 -0.673* -2.332** -2.018*** -2.116*** -2.147*** -3.024***
(0.345) (0.370) (1.018) (0.662) (0.623) (0.618) (1.117)
st−1 0.051 0.070 0.318 0.229 0.244 0.258 0.094
(0.111) (0.117) (0.517) (0.395) (0.376) (0.376) (0.458)
Country FE no no yes yes yes yes -
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
AR(2) test - - - - - - 0.884
Hansen test - - - - - - 0.119
Countries 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Observations 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
Note: We report standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
level, respectively. The standard errors of columns (1), (2), and (3) are clustered at the country level, while
the ones from (4) to (6) are bootstrapped with 50 iterations. Column (7) uses collapsed instruments and
an orthogonal transformation. All of the variables are in logarithms, while population growth and robots
growth were transformed with the Box-Cox transformation. CorrFE refers to the corrected fixed effects with
“bb” indicating initialization by the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator, “ab” initialization by the Arellano
and Bond (1991) estimator, and “ah” initialization by the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator.
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5.7 Baseline estimates using 15% depreciation rate
Table 16: Total robots
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POLS RE FE corrFE (bb) corrFE (ab) corrFE (ah) GMM (sys)
pˆt−1 0.301*** 0.240*** 0.227** 0.174
(0.079) (0.092) (0.098) (0.106)
nt−1 -0.515 -0.683* -1.945** -1.658*** -1.763*** -1.782*** -4.050***
(0.323) (0.353) (0.858) (0.562) (0.528) (0.523) (1.377)
st−1 0.055 0.081 0.337 0.247 0.266 0.272 0.291
(0.118) (0.126) (0.477) (0.335) (0.319) (0.319) (0.542)
Country FE no no yes yes yes yes -
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
AR(2) test - - - - - - 0.790
Hansen test - - - - - - 0.891
Countries 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Observations 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
Note: We report standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
level, respectively. The standard errors of columns (1), (2), and (3) are clustered at the country level, while
the ones from (4) to (6) are bootstrapped with 50 iterations. Column (7) uses collapsed instruments and
an orthogonal transformation. All of the variables are in logarithms, while population growth and robots
growth were transformed with the Box-Cox transformation. CorrFE refers to the corrected fixed effects with
“bb” indicating initialization by the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator, “ab” initialization by the Arellano
and Bond (1991) estimator, and “ah” initialization by the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator.
Table 17: Manufacturing robots
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POLS RE FE corrFE (bb) corrFE (ab) corrFE (ah) GMM (sys)
pˆt−1 0.233*** 0.162* 0.149* 0.071
(0.078) (0.085) (0.090) (0.123)
nt−1 -0.419 -0.605* -2.079** -1.901*** -1.998*** -2.012*** -4.411***
(0.328) (0.365) (0.938) (0.575) (0.534) (0.531) (1.430)
st−1 0.009 0.022 0.072 0.059 0.071 0.075 0.290
(0.086) (0.091) (0.469) (0.342) (0.321) (0.320) (0.491)
Country FE no no yes yes yes yes -
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
AR(2) test - - - - - - 0.481
Hansen test - - - - - - 0.813
Countries 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Observations 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
Note: We report standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
level, respectively. The standard errors of columns (1), (2), and (3) are clustered at the country level, while
the ones from (4) to (6) are bootstrapped with 50 iterations. Column (7) uses collapsed instruments and
an orthogonal transformation. All of the variables are in logarithms, while population growth and robots
growth were transformed with the Box-Cox transformation. CorrFE refers to the corrected fixed effects with
“bb” indicating initialization by the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator, “ab” initialization by the Arellano
and Bond (1991) estimator, and “ah” initialization by the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator.
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5.8 Baseline estimates using the neglog transformation
Table 18: Total robots
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POLS RE FE corrFE (bb) corrFE (ab) corrFE (ah) GMM (sys)
pˆt−1 0.496*** 0.477*** 0.456*** 0.473***
(0.068) (0.081) (0.092) (0.105)
nt−1 -12.135* -15.798** -35.286* -20.726** -21.720** -22.657** -40.401***
(6.436) (6.399) (18.480) (10.299) (10.138) (9.892) (14.349)
st−1 0.321 0.499 2.409** 1.275 1.327 1.383 -0.575
(0.430) (0.475) (0.957) (0.909) (0.916) (0.921) (1.030)
Country FE no no yes yes yes yes -
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
AR(2) test - - - - - - 0.100
Hansen test - - - - - - 0.186
Countries 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Observations 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
Note: We report standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
level, respectively. The standard errors of columns (1), (2), and (3) are clustered at the country level, while
the ones from (4) to (6) are bootstrapped with 50 iterations. Column (7) uses collapsed instruments and
an orthogonal transformation. All of the variables are in logarithms, while population growth and robots
growth were transformed with the Box-Cox transformation. CorrFE refers to the corrected fixed effects with
“bb” indicating initialization by the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator, “ab” initialization by the Arellano
and Bond (1991) estimator, and “ah” initialization by the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator.
Table 19: Manufacturing robots
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POLS RE FE corrFE (bb) corrFE (ab) corrFE (ah) GMM (sys)
pˆt−1 0.257*** 0.192** 0.174* 0.186*
(0.077) (0.086) (0.918) (0.110)
nt−1 -4.084 -5.570* -16.691** -14.854*** -15.714*** -15.892*** -23.165***
(2.791) (3.069) (7.375) (4.150) (3.880) (3.846) (8.161)
st−1 0.030 0.049 0.266 0.219 0.237 0.247 0.152
(0.094) (0.100) (0.469) (0.369) (0.347) (0.347) (0.355)
Country FE no no yes yes yes yes -
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
AR(2) test - - - - - - 0.798
Hansen test - - - - - - 0.219
Countries 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Observations 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
Note: We report standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
level, respectively. The standard errors of columns (1), (2), and (3) are clustered at the country level, while
the ones from (4) to (6) are bootstrapped with 50 iterations. Column (7) uses collapsed instruments and
an orthogonal transformation. All of the variables are in logarithms, while population growth and robots
growth were transformed with the Box-Cox transformation. CorrFE refers to the corrected fixed effects with
“bb” indicating initialization by the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator, “ab” initialization by the Arellano
and Bond (1991) estimator, and “ah” initialization by the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator.
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VERHALTENSMODELLE FÜR SOFTWAREAGENTEN IM  
PUBLIC GOODS GAME 
 
 
ICT 
27-2011 Monnet Benoit, 
Patrick Gbakoua and 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza  
ENGEL CURVES, SPATIAL VARIATION IN PRICES AND 
DEMAND FOR COMMODITIES IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE 
 
 
ECO 
28-2011 Nadine Riedel, 
Hannah Schildberg-
Hörisch 
 
ASYMMETRIC OBLIGATIONS 
 
 
ECO 
29-2011 Nicole Waidlein 
 
CAUSES OF PERSISTENT PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES IN 
THE WEST GERMAN STATES IN THE PERIOD FROM 1950 TO 
1990 
 
IK 
30-2011 Dominik Hartmann, 
Atilio Arata 
 
MEASURING SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INNOVATION IN POOR 
AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITIES. THE CASE OF CHÁPARRA - 
PERU 
 
IK 
31-2011 Peter Spahn DIE WÄHRUNGSKRISENUNION 
DIE EURO-VERSCHULDUNG DER NATIONALSTAATEN ALS 
SCHWACHSTELLE DER EWU 
 
ECO 
32-2011 Fabian Wahl 
 
DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES LEBENSSTANDARDS IM DRITTEN 
REICH – EINE GLÜCKSÖKONOMISCHE PERSPEKTIVE 
 
ECO 
33-2011 Giorgio Triulzi, 
Ramon Scholz and 
Andreas Pyka 
 
R&D AND KNOWLEDGE DYNAMICS IN UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY 
RELATIONSHIPS IN BIOTECH AND PHARMACEUTICALS: AN 
AGENT-BASED MODEL 
IK 
34-2011 Claus D. Müller-
Hengstenberg, 
Stefan Kirn 
 
ANWENDUNG DES ÖFFENTLICHEN VERGABERECHTS AUF 
MODERNE IT SOFTWAREENTWICKLUNGSVERFAHREN 
ICT 
35-2011 Andreas Pyka AVOIDING EVOLUTIONARY INEFFICIENCIES 
IN INNOVATION NETWORKS 
 
IK 
36-2011 David Bell, Steffen 
Otterbach and 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
WORK HOURS CONSTRAINTS AND HEALTH 
 
HCM 
37-2011 Lukas Scheffknecht, 
Felix Geiger 
A BEHAVIORAL MACROECONOMIC MODEL WITH  
ENDOGENOUS BOOM-BUST CYCLES AND LEVERAGE 
DYNAMICS 
 
ECO 
38-2011 Yin Krogmann,  
Ulrich Schwalbe 
 
INTER-FIRM R&D NETWORKS IN THE GLOBAL 
PHARMACEUTICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY DURING 
1985–1998: A CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
 
IK 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
39-2011 
 
Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and  
Oliver Frör 
 
 
RESPONDENT INCENTIVES IN CONTINGENT VALUATION: THE 
ROLE OF RECIPROCITY 
 
    ECO 
40-2011 Tobias Börger  
 
A DIRECT TEST OF SOCIALLY DESIRABLE RESPONDING IN 
CONTINGENT VALUATION INTERVIEWS 
 
    ECO 
41-2011 Ralf Rukwid,  
Julian P. Christ 
 
QUANTITATIVE CLUSTERIDENTIFIKATION AUF EBENE 
DER DEUTSCHEN STADT- UND LANDKREISE (1999-2008) 
    IK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
    
42-2012 Benjamin Schön,  
Andreas Pyka 
 
A TAXONOMY OF INNOVATION NETWORKS IK 
 
43-2012 Dirk Foremny, 
Nadine Riedel 
 
BUSINESS TAXES AND THE ELECTORAL CYCLE        ECO 
44-2012 Gisela Di Meglio, 
Andreas Pyka and 
Luis Rubalcaba 
 
VARIETIES OF SERVICE ECONOMIES IN EUROPE        IK 
45-2012 Ralf Rukwid,  
Julian P. Christ 
INNOVATIONSPOTENTIALE IN BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG: 
PRODUKTIONSCLUSTER IM BEREICH „METALL, ELEKTRO, IKT“ 
UND REGIONALE VERFÜGBARKEIT AKADEMISCHER 
FACHKRÄFTE IN DEN MINT-FÄCHERN 
 
IK 
46-2012 Julian P. Christ,  
Ralf Rukwid 
INNOVATIONSPOTENTIALE IN BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG: 
BRANCHENSPEZIFISCHE FORSCHUNGS- UND 
ENTWICKLUNGSAKTIVITÄT, REGIONALES 
PATENTAUFKOMMEN UND BESCHÄFTIGUNGSSTRUKTUR 
 
       IK 
47-2012 Oliver Sauter ASSESSING UNCERTAINTY IN EUROPE AND THE 
US - IS THERE A COMMON FACTOR? 
       ECO 
48-2012 Dominik Hartmann SEN MEETS SCHUMPETER. INTRODUCING STRUCTURAL AND 
DYNAMIC ELEMENTS INTO THE HUMAN CAPABILITY 
APPROACH 
 
       IK 
49-2012 Harold Paredes-
Frigolett,  
Andreas Pyka 
 
DISTAL EMBEDDING AS A TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION 
NETWORK FORMATION STRATEGY 
       IK 
50-2012 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
CYCLICALITY OF REAL WAGES IN THE USA AND GERMANY: 
NEW INSIGHTS FROM WAVELET ANALYSIS 
       ECO 
51-2012 André P. Slowak DIE DURCHSETZUNG VON SCHNITTSTELLEN 
IN DER STANDARDSETZUNG: 
FALLBEISPIEL LADESYSTEM ELEKTROMOBILITÄT 
       IK 
 
52-2012 
 
Fabian Wahl 
 
WHY IT MATTERS WHAT PEOPLE THINK - BELIEFS, LEGAL 
ORIGINS AND THE DEEP ROOTS OF TRUST 
        
ECO 
 
53-2012 
 
Dominik Hartmann, 
Micha Kaiser 
 
STATISTISCHER ÜBERBLICK DER TÜRKISCHEN MIGRATION IN 
BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG UND DEUTSCHLAND 
        
IK 
 
54-2012 
 
Dominik Hartmann, 
Andreas Pyka, Seda 
Aydin, Lena Klauß, 
Fabian Stahl, Ali 
Santircioglu, Silvia 
Oberegelsbacher, 
Sheida Rashidi, Gaye 
Onan and Suna 
Erginkoç 
 
IDENTIFIZIERUNG UND ANALYSE DEUTSCH-TÜRKISCHER 
INNOVATIONSNETZWERKE. ERSTE ERGEBNISSE DES TGIN-
PROJEKTES 
        
IK 
 
55-2012 
 
Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and 
Oliver Frör 
 
THE ECOLOGICAL PRICE OF GETTING RICH IN A GREEN 
DESERT: A CONTINGENT VALUATION STUDY IN RURAL 
SOUTHWEST CHINA 
 
 
        
ECO 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
56-2012 
 
Matthias Strifler 
Thomas Beissinger 
 
FAIRNESS CONSIDERATIONS IN LABOR UNION WAGE 
SETTING – A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
        
ECO 
 
57-2012 
 
Peter Spahn 
 
INTEGRATION DURCH WÄHRUNGSUNION? 
DER FALL DER EURO-ZONE 
        
ECO 
 
58-2012 
 
Sibylle H. Lehmann 
 
TAKING FIRMS TO THE STOCK MARKET:  
IPOS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF LARGE BANKS IN IMPERIAL 
GERMANY 1896-1913 
        
ECO 
 
59-2012 Sibylle H. Lehmann, 
Philipp Hauber and 
Alexander Opitz 
 
POLITICAL RIGHTS, TAXATION, AND FIRM VALUATION – 
EVIDENCE FROM SAXONY AROUND 1900 
ECO        
 
60-2012 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
SPECTRAN, A SET OF MATLAB PROGRAMS FOR SPECTRAL 
ANALYSIS 
ECO        
 
61-2012 Theresa Lohse, 
Nadine Riedel 
THE IMPACT OF TRANSFER PRICING REGULATIONS ON 
PROFIT SHIFTING WITHIN EUROPEAN MULTINATIONALS 
ECO        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
62-2013 Heiko Stüber REAL WAGE CYCLICALITY OF NEWLY HIRED WORKERS ECO        
 
63-2013 David E. Bloom, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
AGEING AND PRODUCTIVITY HCM 
 
64-2013 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
MONTHLY US BUSINESS CYCLE INDICATORS: 
A NEW MULTIVARIATE APPROACH BASED ON A BAND-PASS 
FILTER 
 
ECO 
 
65-2013 Dominik Hartmann, 
Andreas Pyka 
INNOVATION, ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
IK 
 
66-2013 Christof Ernst, 
Katharina Richter and 
Nadine Riedel 
CORPORATE TAXATION AND THE QUALITY OF RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT 
ECO 
 
 
67-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör, Jiang 
Tong, Luo Jing and 
Sonna Pelz 
 
NONUSE VALUES OF CLIMATE POLICY - AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
IN XINJIANG AND BEIJING 
ECO 
 
68-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Friedrich Schneider 
CONSIDERING HOUSEHOLD SIZE IN CONTINGENT VALUATION 
STUDIES 
ECO 
 
69-2013 Fabio Bertoni,  
Tereza Tykvová 
WHICH FORM OF VENTURE CAPITAL IS MOST SUPPORTIVE 
OF INNOVATION? 
EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN BIOTECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 
 
CFRM 
 
70-2013 Tobias Buchmann, 
Andreas Pyka  
THE EVOLUTION OF INNOVATION NETWORKS: 
THE CASE OF A GERMAN AUTOMOTIVE NETWORK 
IK 
 
71-2013 B. Vermeulen, A. 
Pyka, J. A. La Poutré 
and A. G. de Kok  
CAPABILITY-BASED GOVERNANCE PATTERNS OVER THE 
PRODUCT LIFE-CYCLE 
IK 
 
 
72-2013 
 
Beatriz Fabiola López 
Ulloa, Valerie Møller 
and Alfonso Sousa-
Poza   
 
HOW DOES SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING EVOLVE WITH AGE?  
A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
HCM 
 
 
73-2013 
 
Wencke Gwozdz, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza, 
Lucia A. Reisch, 
Wolfgang Ahrens, 
Stefaan De Henauw, 
Gabriele Eiben, Juan 
M. Fernández-Alvira, 
Charalampos 
Hadjigeorgiou, Eva 
Kovács, Fabio Lauria, 
Toomas Veidebaum, 
Garrath Williams, 
Karin Bammann 
 
MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY – 
A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
HCM 
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74-2013 
 
Andreas Haas, 
Annette Hofmann  
 
 
RISIKEN AUS CLOUD-COMPUTING-SERVICES: 
FRAGEN DES RISIKOMANAGEMENTS UND ASPEKTE DER 
VERSICHERBARKEIT 
 
HCM 
 
 
75-2013 
 
Yin Krogmann, 
Nadine Riedel and 
Ulrich Schwalbe  
 
 
INTER-FIRM R&D NETWORKS IN PHARMACEUTICAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY: WHAT DETERMINES FIRM’S 
CENTRALITY-BASED PARTNERING CAPABILITY? 
 
ECO, IK 
 
 
76-2013 
 
Peter Spahn 
 
MACROECONOMIC STABILISATION AND BANK LENDING: 
A SIMPLE WORKHORSE MODEL 
 
ECO 
 
 
77-2013 
 
Sheida Rashidi, 
Andreas Pyka 
 
MIGRATION AND INNOVATION – A SURVEY 
 
IK 
 
 
78-2013 
 
Benjamin Schön, 
Andreas Pyka 
 
THE SUCCESS FACTORS OF TECHNOLOGY-SOURCING 
THROUGH MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS – AN INTUITIVE META-
ANALYSIS 
 
IK 
 
 
79-2013 
 
Irene Prostolupow, 
Andreas Pyka and 
Barbara Heller-Schuh 
 
TURKISH-GERMAN INNOVATION NETWORKS IN THE 
EUROPEAN RESEARCH LANDSCAPE 
 
IK 
 
 
80-2013 
 
Eva Schlenker, 
Kai D. Schmid 
 
CAPITAL INCOME SHARES AND INCOME 
INEQUALITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
       ECO 
 
81-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and 
Oliver Frör 
THE INFLUENCE OF ETHNICITY AND CULTURE ON THE 
VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS 
– RESULTS FROM A CVM STUDY IN SOUTHWEST CHINA – 
       ECO 
 
82-2013 
 
Fabian Wahl DOES MEDIEVAL TRADE STILL MATTER? HISTORICAL TRADE 
CENTERS, AGGLOMERATION AND CONTEMPORARY 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
       ECO 
 
83-2013 Peter Spahn SUBPRIME AND EURO CRISIS: SHOULD WE BLAME THE 
ECONOMISTS? 
       ECO 
 
84-2013 Daniel Guffarth, 
Michael J. Barber 
THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE R&D COLLABORATION 
NETWORK 
       IK 
 
85-2013 Athanasios Saitis KARTELLBEKÄMPFUNG UND INTERNE KARTELLSTRUKTUREN: 
EIN NETZWERKTHEORETISCHER ANSATZ 
       IK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
86-2014 Stefan Kirn, Claus D. 
Müller-Hengstenberg 
INTELLIGENTE (SOFTWARE-)AGENTEN: EINE NEUE 
HERAUSFORDERUNG FÜR DIE GESELLSCHAFT UND UNSER 
RECHTSSYSTEM? 
 
ICT       
 
87-2014 Peng Nie, Alfonso 
Sousa-Poza 
MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY IN 
CHINA: EVIDENCE FROM THE CHINA HEALTH AND NUTRITION 
SURVEY 
 
HCM        
 
88-2014 Steffen Otterbach, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
JOB INSECURITY, EMPLOYABILITY, AND HEALTH: 
AN ANALYSIS FOR GERMANY ACROSS GENERATIONS 
HCM        
 
89-2014 Carsten Burhop, 
Sibylle H. Lehmann-
Hasemeyer 
 
THE GEOGRAPHY OF STOCK EXCHANGES IN IMPERIAL 
GERMANY 
ECO        
 
90-2014 Martyna Marczak, 
Tommaso Proietti 
OUTLIER DETECTION IN STRUCTURAL TIME SERIES 
MODELS: THE INDICATOR SATURATION APPROACH 
ECO        
 
91-2014 Sophie Urmetzer, 
Andreas Pyka 
VARIETIES OF KNOWLEDGE-BASED BIOECONOMIES IK        
 
92-2014 Bogang Jun,  
Joongho Lee 
THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN FERTILITY AND EDUCATION:  
EVIDENCE FROM THE KOREAN DEVELOPMENT PATH 
IK        
 
93-2014 Bogang Jun,  
Tai-Yoo Kim 
NON-FINANCIAL HURDLES FOR HUMAN CAPITAL 
ACCUMULATION: LANDOWNERSHIP IN KOREA UNDER 
JAPANESE RULE 
 
IK        
 
94-2014 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör, 
Gerhard 
Langenberger and 
Sonna Pelz  
 
CHINESE URBANITES AND THE PRESERVATION OF RARE 
SPECIES IN REMOTE PARTS OF THE COUNTRY – THE 
EXAMPLE OF EAGLEWOOD 
ECO        
 
95-2014 Harold Paredes-
Frigolett, 
Andreas Pyka, 
Javier Pereira and 
Luiz Flávio Autran 
Monteiro Gomes 
 
RANKING THE PERFORMANCE OF NATIONAL INNOVATION 
SYSTEMS IN THE IBERIAN PENINSULA AND LATIN AMERICA 
FROM A NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 
IK        
 
96-2014 Daniel Guffarth, 
Michael J. Barber 
 
NETWORK EVOLUTION, SUCCESS, AND REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 
IK        
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